Ford had to recall 1.2m trucks to replace the cruise control deactivation switch with a new, redesigned unit after it was found that the old switch caused fires.

I own a 2004 E-350 that is factory equipped with the new, redesigned switch.

It failed at about 48,000 miles with the following symptoms:

Cruise control would not reengage after it is disengaged with a brake tap.

However, if you "stomp" on the brakes hard at speed, it would work again.

It would also work again if you come to a full stop, and restart.

Solution:

Replace the cruise control deactivation switch. ($20, a bolt on part.)

However, replacing the switch require that the brake system be bled.

So if you haven't changed the brake fluid lately, it is a good time to do the same.

After the new switch is installed, it worked "like new".

 

Even redesigned parts can go bad from time to time.

It's also possible that the switch was fine.. just some air got trapped in it. You're supposed to put a couple drops of fluid into the switch before installing it. If you do that, bleeding the brakes should not be necessary.

 

Your redesigned switch failed, but it didn't burn up the van, so I guess that is some improvement.

What I can't figure out is this is not rocket science. They have been making those type of switches for years, and they were the original factory brake switch on the old Ford pickups(my 53 f100 had one).

The only explanation I can think of is they are thinking of new, faster, cheaper ways of making things. Components that come to mind that have really no excuse for failure are the heater core failures in the 80's mustangs, caliper sticking problems in some of the phenolic type pistons, paint failures in the 80's Ford products(Dupont's fault), these simple switches failing, door lock failures on the newer trucks, signal switch failures(the famous multi-function switch), etc.

If I though hard enough, I could keep going. These are all common parts that have been used in vehicles for years, but because of some sort of "improved" design, tend to fail way too early.

 

Well, to be perfectly fair, things have changed since the 1950s.

Anti-lock brake systems fundamentally changed the stress loads on brake components (imagine the hydrostatic load when it pulses).

However, the truth is that it has been over a decade since ABS systems have been in widespread use, and surely in that time, the manufactures had plenty of time to learn / characterize materials and designs and to do it right.

The improvement in the cruise control disengage switch not catching fire is a good one. However, what has not been done is decent validation (assuming I am not the only one with the problem), which is consistent with the switch being designed in a rush and in desperation after the original switch failed disasterously.

Yes, no doubt faster, cheaper things do play a role (I can tell you stories about how the same parts on our Chryslers manufactured 10 years repeatedly failed in precisely the same manner), but I think there is more to the story.

My question to the manufacturers is: it is long past the time when anti-trust issues prevent manufactures from working together. When we look at the cost issues involved in such ridiculous failings... doesn't it make sense for ALL the major manufactures to get together and come up with a common parts design that they all share (and because they share it, they can pool purchasing, design, engineering, validation, etc.).

Once a common part is made right, it can then be industry certified and individually serialized (with a serial number) to make it harder for clone makers to come in for a fraction of a penny less, and it would confer no advantage to any participating manufacturer to use a slightly cheaper source when everyone is getting the same price. Of course, non-participating makers can use cheaper parts, but that exposes them to the liabilities and risks of being outside of the 'system'. This would also reduce the incentive for manufactures to play off the parts makers to 'excess'.

The common part can then be manufactured by two or three major makers, who can bid on each part with the understanding that the same part is interchagable (no manufacturer induced uniqueness that is done just for the sake of being different). Such a way of doing things would of course, take the margins out of the OEM parts business... but that is coming out anyways whether they like it or not.

If such component failuers that ought not to have happened are out of the way of the car manufactuer's hair, they can go back to doing things that we actually would gladly pay them for: designing and building neat, attractive cars that meet our needs and hence, we are willing to give them a good price (and margin) for.

Add up the billions lost in recalls like the Firestone tires, the fires, etc. and it is clear that manufacturers are distracted from doing their core job by these gaffs.

Finally, the government can come in and 'type certify' the parts and confer on the users of a certified part a limited liability shield, lowering the costs for everyone but the trial lawyers.

The industry is badly in need of new thinking if we are not going to be all stuck driving Toyotas. (which are far more troublesome than their reputation indicate).


D.

 

I do not believe it is possible for air to be entrapped in the switch.

The switch is oriented upwards at the bottom of the Master Cylinder.

Any air entrained in it would naturally leak UP to the Master Cylinder.

Likewise, it is not possible to ensure that all air is out of the system unless you bleed the brakes.

When you replace the switch, you open a hole in the master cylinder that points downward.

When you insert the new switch (even if you filled the hole with fluid), you cannot but help trapping air between the face of the switch and the master cylinder as you tighten the switch in.

The air cannot be released except via the thread --- which can release some until it seals, but because it is likely to be sealed quickly by brake fluid dripping down, it is all but certain that air will be entrained in the master cylinder unless you bleed the brakes.

If Ford recommends another procedure for changing out this switch (that do not involve bleeding the brakes), by all means let me know and give me the reference to the relevant manual.

D.

 

Per the appropriate service manual, bleeding the system IS required on this vehicle when replacing the deactivator switch. See section 310-03 in the 2004 E-Series Workshop Manual.

For anyone who has the time, suggested reading is of the engineering failure analysis report (available at NHTSA's site) of the orignal switches. Among the conclusions was that the switch was not the immediate cause of the failure, the true cause of the failure was the master cylinder which allowed a slight vacuum to be applied to the Kapton membrane when the pedal was released which deformed the membrane. This deformation weaked the membrane (which was never designed to have a vacuum subjected to it) and lead to its eventual failure (leakage) and the fire hazard.

Read the report, it's quite interesting.

Steve

 

Thanks Steve!

I am glad that this shade tree mechanic without a shop manual did the job properly!

There are 2 part numbers for the replacement switch. One is the switch by itself. The other part number is the switch with a pigtail and connector which I SUSPECT (I did not check) contains a fusible link to eliminate the hazard.

Being my lazy self, I bought the switch with the pigtail (a few $ more) but installed it without the new pigtail (which would have meant having to splice the new pigtail in).

If anyone knows whether this new pigtail contains the fusible link, please let me know and I will splice it in in place of the existing plug.

Does anyone know if the E-350 2004 has that circuit energized all the time like the F-150s that were recalled?

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I did read the failure analysis report on the old switches --- it really opens a wider question as to whether that vacumme force is applied to ALL brake master cylinders, perhaps in lesser degrees which means the failure hasn't cropped up before or simply showed up as a failed switch without the fire.

The catastrophic failure mode (fire) is a function of Ford's engineering which turned a failed switch from a fluid leak / corrosion into a fire because the circuit is a) always on, b) not fused.

The real sad part about the NHTSA report is that Ford had to be confronted by the government with an independent test before they agreed to recall and fix the problem.

It kind of sounds like the Boeing 737 Rudder Actuation Hydralic Valve story... Boeing didn't fix the problem until they were confronted by the NTSB.

"Deny, Deny, Deny... "